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I. Introduction
Women's labor force participation (LFP) rates in the U.S. experienced a marked increase between 1965 and 1980, the improvement being most remarkable for married women. For instance, during these fifteen years, the LFP rate of married women ages 25 to 29 rose from 33 percent to 58 percent in the labor force, an increase of 25 percentage points. In contrast, in the next fifteen years-from 1980 to 1995-the LFP rate for this age group grew by only 11
percentage points, to 69 percent of the labor force. Furthermore, between 1995 and 2005, the LFP rate of married women ages 25 to 29 decreased slightly to 66.5 percent. Likewise, during the same ten years, the LFP of married women ages 30 to 34 decreased by 2.5 percentage points.
Economic explanations of such historical trends in female labor supply have principally focused on the effects of wages, income, educational attainment, and the number of children born to potential labor force participants. In this paper, we argue that historical fluctuations in cohort size, due principally to the changing number of births in adjacent cohorts, cause fluctuations in sex ratios-the ratio of men to women--that affect marriage market conditions.
We predict that such fluctuations in sex ratio help explain female LFP rates. Additionally, we predict that sex ratio effects (regional and at the cohort level) will be stronger among women with less education. Both predictions, consistent with both Demand and Supply and collective economic theories of marriage, are tested using individual data from Current Population Surveys for the U.S. as a whole and for each of its four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) covering the 1965-2005 period at five-year intervals.
Our analysis expands on previous analyses of changes in women's LFP over time by Pencavel (1998) and Grossbard-Shechtman and Granger (1998) that are also based on the analysis of Current Population Survey (CPS) data. Pencavel (1998) documented considerable 2 variation in women's LFP rates across cohorts and the limited explanatory power of fluctuations in wage and income -both variables typically included in economic models of labor supply.
Using time-series aggregated CPS data for the period 1965 to 1990 , Grossbard-Shechtman and Granger (1998 showed that the women experiencing the most rapid increases in LFP had been born in a growing cohort, i.e. a baby-boom. 1 Using aggregate CPS data, and similar aggregate data for Japan, Fukuda (2006) utilizes an innovative Bayesian cohort model that allows simultaneous estimation of age, period, and cohort effects on female labor force participation.
While cohort effects in both countries were substantial--exceeding the size of period effects in their magnitude-the U.S. had larger cohort effects on female LFP than Japan.
We add to these studies by including cohort-level sex ratios in our analysis, by allowing for regional variation, and by expanding the time span of the analysis to 2005. Additionally, we examine how sex ratio effects on women's LFP rates differ by educational attainment. Finally, we carry out the analysis for both married women and for all women regardless of marital status to address variations in the sex ratio effects according to women's marital status.
II. Predictions
A) Sex Ratios
It follows from at least three economic theories of marriage that sex ratios of marriage eligibles will be inversely related to married women's LFP: Grossbard's demand and supply (D&S) model of marriage (Grossbard-Shechtman's 1984 , 1993 , and collective models by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 and Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2006) . That collective models and D&S models lead to similar predictions is not surprising given that the second step in these two-step decision-making models are very similar. In both kinds of models, Step 2 consists of individuals 3 deciding on their labor force participation by maximizing their own utility subject to a budget constraint that includes pre-determined access to the spouse's income. In both kinds of models, access to the spouse's income is determined in Step 1 in some form of agreement between the spouses, and the agreement is likely to favor more those spouses who benefit from advantageous marriage market conditions such as high sex ratios (high ratios of male to female).
Step 1 is based on different assumptions in collective models and D&S models. In collective models, access to the spouse's income is determined by a sharing rule agreed upon by the couple. This sharing rule may not depend on work in household production, as is the case in Chiappori (1988) and the Chiappori model predicting sex ratio effects on female LFP (Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix 2002) , or it may depend on work in household production, as in Chiappori (1997) and Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2006) . In Grossbard's D&S model, work in household production plays a central role and a couple agrees on the terms of trade between work in household production and access to income (interpreted as a quasi-wage). Individuals have a supply of marital household labor, which implies that they set apart time resources that they are not willing to allocate towards any household production performed in couple, given possible levels of quasi-wage. 2 Likewise, individual demands for such work involves a separation between what one is willing to purchase at different prices, and what is not demanded.
Collective models and D&S models differ in the role marriage markets play in influencing individual bargaining. In collective models, there are no market level prices for work in household production that influence individual bargaining agreements, in a manner analogous to the role of market wages in bargaining between employer and worker. Marriage market conditions influence individual bargaining power but not market-level terms of trade between 4 work and access to income. In D&S models, when marriage partners agree that one is willing to supply what the other is willing to demand at a given quasi-wage, they are influenced by the terms of trade established in informal collective bargaining between many men and women interacting in the same marriage markets. Quasi-wage earners are typically the primary workers in household production, while their spouses are typically the primary market wage earners. To the extent that there is a traditional division of labor by gender, as assumed in Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1981 , men are likely to pay women quasi-wages.
It follows from both kinds of models that marriage market conditions influence the individual's decision on how to allocate her/his own time to work in the labor force. When marriage markets are more favorable to women, women's quasi-wages are higher (according to
Step 1 in a D&S model) and the sharing rule favors women more (according to Step 1 in a collective model). In both kinds of models, more favorable marriage market conditions for women translate into more material resources for women (in Step 1) and, consequently, as a result of an income effect, women are less likely to participate in the labor force (in Step 2).
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One advantage of the D&S models is that they are reminiscent of labor market models and ideas can be imported from labor market analysis to the analysis of marriage markets. For example, one can look at education as a factor that influences the aggregate demand for work in marital production by women or men of different educational levels. Likewise, education can affect aggregate supply of such work. As a result, education may affect market levels of quasiwage and therefore individual opportunities for intra-household bargaining. According to Grossbard (1984 Grossbard ( , 1993 Step 1, more educated people may be more likely to seek nonmaterial quasi-wages for work in marital household production, leading to a smaller income 5 effect in Step 2. It is also possible that more educated women may have more egalitarian marriages in which work in marital household production is more frequently replaced by contracts to outsiders, such as restaurants and child care workers. This would lead to lower material compensation for household production in Step 1 and a smaller income effect in Step 2.
For both of these reasons, we predict a smaller correlation between marriage market conditions and women's labor force participation among college-educated couples than among less educated couples (see Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman 1988) . However, it is also possible that education raises productivity in work in household production and that when sex ratios increase educated women's quasi-wages, established in markets for more educated women's work in marital production, benefit more than is the case with the quasi-wages of less educated women.
According to both models, it is also possible for the sex ratio effects on women's LFP to vary with male income and education. Marriage market conditions may not simply be a matter of how many men per woman are available in a given marriage market, but also of the extent to which these men are willing to let women obtain access to their income. A higher sex ratio is more likely to induce women's withdrawal from the labor force if men have a more attractive financial position (on the importance of sex ratios incorporating men's earning power see Lichter et al. 1995) . It thus follows that there will be more of a negative correlation between married women's LFP and sex ratios at higher levels of male education and income.
Sex ratio effects on women's LFP are also expected to vary according to their marital status. On the one hand, married women's access to men's income (Step 1) is likely to vary more with marriage market conditions (as measured by sex ratios) than that of women of any other marital status (single, cohabiting, separated, widowed or divorced). Accordingly, we 6 expect stronger sex ratio effects on the LFP of married women than on the LFP of women of any marital status. On the other hand, the LFP of women of any marital status -married and unmarried-is expected to vary with the sex ratio more than that of married women for two reasons. First, sex ratio effects are likely to have an effect on marital status, the higher the sex ratio, the more women are likely to be married and married women work less in the labor force.
Secondly, male willingness to give women access to their income will vary with their marital status. As such, analyses of the LFP of married women are more likely to provide evidence supporting the arguments found in D&S and collective models of marriage.
In the past, cross-city comparisons have provided evidence of a negative association between sex ratios and married women's labor supply. It has been found that married women are more likely to supply labor in cities where sex ratios are higher than average (GrossbardShechtman and Neideffer 1997 , Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix 2002 , Rapoport, Sofer, and Solaz 2006 . However, a negative association between regional sex ratios and women's LFP is not necessarily caused by marriage market effects on LFP (income effects due to variation in quasiwages or sharing rule). Good labor demand conditions for women may simultaneously lead women to participate more in the labor force and attract female migrants, thereby lowering sex ratios. This alternative explanation for a negative association between sex ratios and women's LFP only applies where labor migration is feasible. However, migration cannot occur across different birth cohorts and, therefore, evidence of sex ratio effects based on cohort comparisons is potentially more supportive of a marriage market theory of labor supply than evidence based on cross-regional or cross-city comparisons.
Sex ratios vary over time because of fluctuations in cohort size. Cohort size variations can cause fluctuations in sex ratio because, on average, men dating or marrying a particular group of women tend to be older than they are. For instance, if a particular cohort is larger than a preceding cohort, the sex ratio calculated for that particular group of women will be less than one. 4 Such is the case of cohorts of women born at the beginning of a baby boom and likely to marry men born prior to that baby boom who belong to smaller cohorts. Vice-versa, if a particular cohort of women is smaller than a preceding cohort, the sex ratio will be larger than one. For example, cohorts of women born at the beginning of a baby bust will typically marry men born prior to that baby bust who belong to larger cohorts. 
B) Other Variables Affecting Female Labor Force Participation
We also build on past research on women's LFP rates and include the following variables in our analyses.
Household Income and Female Wages: According to Mincer (1962) , higher wages had been a major reason why women were attracted to join the labor force prior to 1960. Mincer solved a puzzle that had confounded labor economists at the time: time series results showed that women's LFP and wages were growing in the same direction, in apparent contradiction to findings of a negative association between wages and women's LFP based on cross-sectional data. Mincer resolved this puzzle by separating the effects of male and female wages. What explained women's entry into the labor force in time series were increases in women's wages, whereas increases in male wages accounted for the negative association between wages and women's LFP in cross-sections studies. Mincer interpreted the effect of married women's own wages on their LFP rates as a substitution effect and the effect of husbands' wages primarily as an income effect.
While this wage/income explanation has held for earlier periods, its effectiveness in explaining recent trends in LFP seems limited. A number of studies have indicated that, in recent years, women's wages and their LFP have not been moving in the same direction. Rosen (1992) pointed out that the LFP rates of women increased greatly during the 1970's, when women's wages were stagnant or declining. It is possible that a low positive association between female wages and female labor supply reflects the fact that women entering the labor market for the first time had low levels of human capital.
Based on cross-sections from various years of the CPS, Leibowitz and Klerman (1995) found that, relative to women's wages, men's wages and unemployment explained more changes in married mothers' employment between 1971 and 1990. A possible explanation for the stronger effect exhibited by male wages on women's LFP relative to female wages is that female wages are endogenous in a study of female LFP. For any given demand for female labor, changes in the supply of that labor will cause fluctuations in wages. Therefore, we carry our analysis with and without controls for female non-labor income and for average wages earned by other women in the same age-education-region-year cell to assess the robustness of sex ratio effects in explaining female LFP to the inclusion of these two regressors.
Education: Previous studies have found that the rise in women's LFP was associated with increased levels of education. 5 This is consistent with the view that education improves the individual's preparation for the job market, raising the opportunity cost of leisure and home production, leading to increased participation in the labor market. Additionally, educational attainment may also impact women's LFP via its impact on marriage opportunities and on preferences. Educated couples tend to have a preference for a more egalitarian division of labor (Hersch 2003) , which in turn may facilitate married women's labor force participation.
Therefore, we account for women's educational attainment and, as with female wages, we carry 10 out the analysis with and without controls for educational attainment in order to assess the robustness of our sex ratio effect estimates to the inclusion of this potentially endogenous regressor.
Fertility:
The growth in women's LFP rates over time has also been shown to coincide with decreases in fertility. 6 Causality here can go either way. Not only is it possible that lower fertility explained increases in women's labor supply, but higher LFP rates may have also lowered fertility. More generally, labor supply and fertility may also be spuriously related due to the effect of other variables on both labor supply and fertility (e.g. Deville 1977 and Lehrer and Nerlove 1986) . Acknowledging the importance of women's childbearing on their LFP choices, and despite the difficulties of isolating its true impact due to endogeneity reasons, we control for women's fertility in some specifications with a dummy variable indicative of the presence of children less than three years old living in the household.
Change in attitudes: Partially as a result of the decreasing explanatory power of wage/income variables, 7 scholars -especially those trained in sociology-have turned to cultural explanations focused on variables such as attitudes towards work and family. We include a time trend, region of residence dummies, and interaction terms between the time trend and the set of regional dummies to allow for differences in attitudes towards work and family across regions as well as over time.
In the next section, we examine the LFP effects of sex ratios over time (cohort size effects) and across regions while accounting for the aforementioned factors possibly influencing female LFP decisions.
III. Data and Empirical Methodology
A) Data
With the exception of the data on sex ratios, the data used in this study are extracted from Current Population Surveys (CPS, March files) for four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) covering the period 1965 to 2005 at five-year intervals. The CPS data are all individuallevel data, except for average female wage, that is calculated for each region/age group/year cell.
Non-labor household income is defined as total household income minus the respondent's labor income.
Our sample includes women 25 to 44, and we create age dummies for the following age groups: 25 to 29, 30 to 34, and 35 to 39. Since women with young children at home have a higher likelihood of receiving intra-marriage transfers of income, we only consider women younger than 44 years old.
In calculating sex ratios, we assume that the male/female age difference at marriage is, on average, equal to two years. This assumption fits the data on first marriages in the U.S. for most of the period that we cover: 8 in the period 1965-1995, despite a considerable rise in age at marriage, the age difference between male and female age at first marriage fluctuated between 2.2 and 2.7. 9 Sex ratios are calculated from Census data for five-year age groups by dividing the number of all men two years older by the number of all women ages 20-24 or 25-29 (depending on the year), regardless of marital status, i.e. we compute:
where M is the number of men and F the number of women. We expect that people are most likely to be 12 influenced by sex ratios when they are in their twenties and are most likely to enter a first marriage. What moves cohort-level variation in sex ratios is the difference between the number of women born in years (t+3) and (t+4) and the number of men born in years (t-1) and (t-2).
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The resulting cohort-level sex ratios are merged into the CPS data according to women's birth year and region of residence. The numbers of men and women born in years t, (t+1), and (t+2) are roughly equal and appear in both the numerator and the denominator. 11 Links between abortion law changes and changes in fertility in the 1970s have been discussed, e.g. by Donohue and Levitt (2001) and Angrist and Evans (2002) . Oreffice (2007) We analyze sex ratio effects on the LFP of two samples of women: (1) about 200,000
women of varying marital status, and (2) around 140,000 married women. Table B .
B) Empirical Methodology
We first specify a parsimonious model of women's LFP that excludes any potentially endogenous regressors:
where Φ stands for the standard normal cumulative distribution, LFP equals 1 if women are in the labor force, SR is the sex ratio for women in a particular birth cohort and region, A indicates the particular age group to which the female respondent belongs to, NLI represents women's non-labor income, R stands for region dummies, and trend is a time trend. Interactions between the sex ratios and the region dummies recognize regional differences in changes in cohort size due principally to regional differences in fertility, inter-region as well as international migration.
Interactions between the time trend and the region dummies address difficult to capture trends in work and family attitudes, as well as differences in the adoption timing of specific time-saving technologies across regions (see Greenwood and Guner 2004 ) -all factors that could impact the LFP of women at different rates depending on the region where they live. However, the model specified in equation (1) Yet, if we want to further assess whether sex ratios have a differential effect on married women's LFP rates depending on their educational attainment, we need to interact the sex ratio ( ) SR with women's educational attainment ( ) f E . It follows from our earlier discussion that the coefficient of this interaction term is expected to be negative. We also include interactions between women's educational attainment and region of residence to account for regional differences in educational levels and policies. Finally, a three-way interaction term of sex ratios, women's educational attainment, and region dummies allows us to test whether there are regional differences in sex ratio effects by educational attainment. Hence, our third model specification is given by: 
IV. Results
Estimations of models 1 through 3 for the U.S. as a whole are displayed in Tables 2A   through 2C . The corresponding results by U.S. region are shown in Tables 3A through 3C. 14 Each table presents results for women of any marital status and for married women. Models 1 and 2 involve a test of our main prediction: that sex ratios and women's LFP are inversely related. In accordance with our prediction, we find a negative association between sex ratio and women's LFP in all estimations of models 1 and 2, whether we just consider married women or whether we look at women of any marital status. For example, according to parsimonious model 1 (Table 2A) , an increase in the sex ratio from 1.00 to 1.10 is associated with a decrease in the LFP of married women of 2.15 percentage points. The corresponding decrease in the LFP of women of any marital status is 3 percentage points.
The regressions presented in Tables 2B and 3B test model 2. They show that, despite weakening, sex ratio effects on women's LFP remain robust to the inclusion of women's wages, education, and presence of young children in the analysis. For instance, the effect on LFP of an increase in sex ratio of .10 is comparable to that of an increase in education of a little more than 2 years. The lower sex ratio effects in Table 2B (after controlling for education, income and the presence of small children in the household) than in Table 2A (which lacks such controls) is suggestive of both Easterlin's explanation and the marriage market explanation of sex ratio effects applying to the parsimonious model estimates of Table 2A .
In the regressions in Tables 2A and 2B , sex ratio effects are the result of both regional and cohort-level variation in sex ratios. The regional models in Table 3A estimate We also predicted that the inverse association between the sex ratio and female LFP is less likely to hold for more educated women than for women with less education, i.e. the interaction term between the sex ratio and women's years of schooling in equation (3) is expected to be positive. Model 3, containing an interaction term between the sex ratio and female education and the corresponding regional dummies, is estimated for the U.S. as a whole (Table 2C ) and for each major region (Table 3C ). The results from Table 2C indicate that the interaction between education and sex ratio has a negative sign among married women, whereas the simple effect of sex ratio is positive in the case of the reference region (the Midwest). The net effect of sex ratio in the Midwest and the Northeast is negative (obtained after adding the negative marginal effect -0.08 to the positive marginal effect 0.13), while the interaction between education and sex ratio has a positive sign. Among women of any marital status, the interaction between education and sex ratio is not significant, except in the West, where it takes a positive sign.
In light of the regional differences pointed out earlier, we also display the results by region. It is also apparent from the results in Table 3C that sex ratio effects vary by education in opposite ways in the Midwest relative to the Northeast and West of the U.S. Our prediction was that material quasi-wages matter more in marriages involving less educated women, among whom traditional gender roles are likely to play a more important role than among marriages involving more educated women. This prediction seems to apply in the West and the Northeast, but not in the Midwest. The possibility exists that economic conditions in the Midwest induced more educated married women in this region to step into the labor force at a higher rate than their counterparts in the Northeast and West of the U.S.
Next, we investigate whether the sign on the interaction terms between female education and the sex ratio possibly originated from a positive correlation between male and female education. Specifically, for married women, we estimate a fourth model similar to model (3) that, in addition to the sex ratio interacted with the wife's education, includes the husband's education and interactions between the sex ratio and the husband's education. This model was first estimated for the U.S. as a whole. Results are displayed in Table 4 . According to our estimates in Table 4 , adding husbands' educational attainment and the corresponding interaction 18 terms does not increase the explanatory power of our model. The new terms are statistically not different from zero.
However, because regional differences could mask cohort-level sex ratio effects, similar regressions are also estimated by region in Table 5 . We find evidence of a larger negative sex ratio effect on the LFP of women married to more educated men in the Northeast and the South.
This result confirms the importance of incorporating men's earning power when calculating how sex ratios affect marriage conditions, as argued by Lichter et al. (1995) .
V. Discussion and Conclusions
Using individual CPS data for selected years spanning 1965 to 2005, we test the prediction of a negative association between sex ratios and women's LFP for married women as well as for all women regardless of their marital status. For the U.S. as a whole, variation in the sex ratio -the ratio of men two years older to women two years younger regardless of marital status-is obtained from regional differences and cohort differences. A negative association between sex ratios and women's LFP could be the result of differences in labor market opportunities across regions which, in turn, could lead to migrating patterns that end up changing sex ratios in the aforementioned direction. Therefore, we also carry the analysis by U.S. regions so that sex ratio effects only reflect cohort-level effects.
After accounting for a time trend and other relevant factors, we find that women born during a baby-boom and, therefore, facing a low sex ratio when they enter dating and marriage markets twenty years later, had significantly higher LFP than women born in a baby-bust or during times of constant population growth. Vice-versa, women who were born during a babybust and, therefore, experiencing a high sex ratio in marriage markets, had significantly lower LFP than women born in a baby-boom or during times of constant population growth. These 19 results, which hold for all women, regardless of their marital status, as well as for the U.S. as a whole and for most U.S. regions, are based on the assumption that the difference in average age at marriage between men and women stays equal to two years over the entire period studied -a reasonable assumption given the actual evolution of that age difference.
Our results help explain why in recent years we have observed some drops in women's LFP, such as a decrease of 3.5 percentage points between 1995 and 2005 in the LFP rates for married women ages 30 to 34 (see Table 1 ). During those years, the women who entered these age groups were women of the Moon and Roe generations characterized by high sex ratios. In contrast, when women from cohorts characterized by low sex ratios entered this age group, we observe rapid increases in their LFP. We also predicted that the negative association between sex ratios and women's LFP would be less valid for educated women than for women with low education. Two regions offer evidence for this prediction: the West and the Northeast. In those regions, sex ratio effects on women's LFP are stronger for women who are less educated. In the Midwest, we consistently get the opposite result, i.e. sex ratio effects on women's LFP are stronger for more educated women. Additionally, the analysis by women's marital status reveals that our prediction of a smaller sex ratio effect on women's LFP among more educated women -a prediction that makes sense within the context of an economic analysis of bargaining in marriage, is corroborated for married women.
To the extent that it applies to women with partners, our basic finding of an inverse association between sex ratio and women's LFP is consistent with both D&S and collective 20 models of decision-making in marriage or cohabitation. According to the collective models, higher sex ratios imply that women will obtain a more advantageous sharing rule when they and their partners (or partners to be) bargain over the distribution of resources that were pooled together. According to the Grossbard's D&S model, higher sex ratios imply that marriage markets have established more advantageous quasi-wages for female household production workers. Our second finding -a positive association between women's LFP and the interaction between female education and sex ratio is interpreted in terms of less educated women being more interested in working in remunerated household production. In the Midwest, we find a negative association between women's LFP and the interaction between female education and sex ratio. This result could be indicative of educated women living in the Midwest encountering a greater opportunity cost for not working.
In future work, it would be of interest to use alternative measures of sex ratio, including measures that only take singles into account -either calibrated to every single-year birth cohort or considering a range of possible age differences as in Goldman et al. (1984) . Likewise, it would be helpful to gain a better understanding of how sex ratios affect other dimensions of labor supply, such as the labor supply of men, and the attachment of men and women to the labor force in an international context. 
Notes:
1 Ratio of men age 22 to 26 to women age 20 to 24 or men age 27 to 31 to women age 25 to 29 calculated based on Census data from 1940 to 2000. The age group depends on the Census year. Sex ratios for last generation were calculated based on the 2000 Census using younger age groups.
2 Calculated from CPS years 1965-2005. 
